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INTRODUCTION

All sentencing systems make use of information beyond the elements of
the offense of conviction. This practice, known generally as "real-offense
sentencing," is necessary because of the complexity and variety of criminal
behavior and the need to keep criminal statutes relatively simple. Two
defendants convicted of violating the same statute may be very different in
terms of amount of harm caused, levels of personal culpability, and degrees of
dangerousness to the community.
One of the enduring challenges in sentencing policymaking is the need to
identify the appropriate structure and scope of real-offense sentencing. What
facts beyond the elements of the offense of conviction should have an impact
on the defendant's sentence? Should consideration of such additional facts be

* Dean and Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Thanks to Steve
Chanenson and Marc Miller for their helpful comments.
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systematized or left to the discretion of individual judges? Should certain types
of information be excluded from sentencing decisionmaking, even if they are
logically relevant? What process and burden of proof should apply to such factfinding?
The United States Sentencing Commission adopted a radical policy that
requires judges to consider, in a mechanistic way, a great deal of real-offense
sentencing information. This policy helped make the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines overly rigid and complex and contributed directly to the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Booker1 to invalidate the mandatory nature

of the current Federal Sentencing Guidelines. As Congress and the Sentencing
Commission consider the appropriate response to Booker, they should
dramatically scale back this disastrous approach to real-offense sentencing.
Fortunately, good models exist in a number of states with more successful
sentencing guidelines.
I. WHAT IS REAL-OFFENSE SENTENCING?

Real-offense sentencing is easier to discuss than to define. 2 In some ways,
it is easier to identify what real-offense sentencing is not. It is not its polar
opposite: charge-offense sentencing. Pure charge-offense sentencing involves
setting a sentence or sentencing range based entirely on the statute of
conviction. The consideration of any facts beyond the elements of the offense
introduces "real-offense" elements. I will use the term in this broad sense: realoffense sentencing is the use in sentencing of any facts beyond those
necessarily found by a jury in reaching a guilty verdict or admitted by a
defendant as part of a guilty plea. Real-offense sentencing information can
concern the offense or the offender. It can relate to the harm caused by the
offense, the defendant's culpability, or background information about the
offender.
The principal reason generally cited for employing real-offense sentencing
information is that the facts necessary for conviction are generally quite
limited. Even in jurisdictions with well-developed criminal codes, criminal
statutes tend to be broad in scope. Two defendants convicted of violating the
same criminal statute may present vastly different situations. Whether a
sentencing decision is being based on retributive or utilitarian purposes, more

information than that which is provided in the statute of conviction may be
needed, If one is interested in how much harm was caused by a robbery, for
example, it is important to know how much money was taken, whether a

1. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
2. See David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic and Injustice: Real-Offense Sentencing and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REV. 403, 408-12 (1993); see also Kevin R.
Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. REV. 523, 526
& n. 15 (1993) (noting different definitions of real-offense sentencing).
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weapon was used, whether injury was inflicted, etc. In assessing the offender's
culpability, whether the offender was a leader in the criminal activity or played
a very minor role can be a critical distinction. To determine the offender's
amenability to treatment or future dangerousness, much personal information is
needed, including prior criminal offenses, employment or educational history,
and family and community ties. Few if any of these facts are likely to be part of
the definition of the offense for which the defendant was convicted. If they are
to be considered, then, it must be through fact-finding at the sentencing stage.
Defined in this manner, real-offense sentencing information is potentially
limitless. No sentencing process, of course, will inquire endlessly into facts
about the offense and offender. First, as noted above, the purposes of
punishment that are emphasized by a particular sentencing regime impact the
relevance of potential real-offense sentencing information. Pragmatic
considerations require that sentencing fact-finding not be unduly time
consuming or complicated. Considerations of fairness may argue for limiting
the impact of facts not proved to a jury or admitted by the defendant. No
system, then, is likely to approach a "pure" real-offense model. The important
questions are who decides which real-offense elements are incorporated into
sentencing decisions, by what fact-finding process, and with what weight?
The proper approach to real-offense sentencing cannot be determined in a
vacuum. Whether particular information should help determine a sentence
depends upon the goals the sentencer is pursuing. An individual judge or a
sentencing commission aiming for deterrence or incapacitation will be
interested in different information than a sentencer focusing on just deserts. In
addition, these questions look different when addressed to a traditional
sentencing system marked by broad judicial discretion than to a guidelines
system in which judicial discretion is significantly curtailed.
In traditional sentencing systems marked by broad judicial discretion, the
answers to these questions are fairly clear, if ultimately unsatisfying. Sentences
can be influenced by virtually any information about the offense or the
offender. The decisions about what facts to emphasize and how much weight to
give to those facts rest with each sentencing judge.3 There is no guiding
sentencing philosophy and usually no meaningful appellate review of
sentences. Judges do not have to explain their decisions, and where they
explicitly find facts, they may do so based simply on a preponderance of the
evidence standard. This does not mean that judges always make great use of
this power to consider real-offense elements or that all judges do so in the same
way. Real-offense sentencing in a discretionary sentencing system is "sporadic
and unpredictable. ' 4 I have previously referred to this condition as

3. See Reitz, supra note 2, at 528 ("Nearly every state allows sentencing courts to
engage freely in real-offense sentencing as a matter of discretion.").
4. See Yellen, supra note 2, at 419.
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"discretionary or permissive real-offense sentencing."

5

II. REAL-OFFENSE SENTENCING AND SENTENCING GUIDELINES

When jurisdictions move from broad judicial discretion to structuredsentencing systems, such as sentencing guidelines, they must confront the
questions about real-offense sentencing head on. How should sentencing
guidelines take account of facts beyond the offense of conviction? There are at
least three possible approaches. First, drafters of sentencing guidelines could
determine that some facts beyond the offense of conviction are important
enough to be incorporated into the calculation of the applicable sentencing
range. Second, the guidelines range could be determined largely or entirely
based on the offense of conviction, but within the exercise of her discretion in
choosing a particular sentence within the authorized range, a judge could be
permitted to rely on real-offense factors. Third, judges could be authorized to
deviate or depart from the applicable guidelines range based on real-offense
factors determined at sentencing. Aspects of each of these approaches are
apparent in sentencing guidelines systems in place today across the country.
In addition to the arguments for and against real-offense sentencing noted
above, structured-sentencing systems raise particular issues regarding plea
bargaining and prosecutorial influence on sentences. 6 In a system of judicial
discretion, the charges brought against a defendant determine the statutory
maximum but otherwise have limited impact on the sentence imposed. Linking
the sentence imposed more closely to the offense of conviction, as all
sentencing guidelines systems do, increases the prosecutor's influence on
sentences because prosecutors have broad authority to select or reject the
charges that might be brought against the offender. In theory, then, a chargebased guidelines system shifts a great deal of sentencing authority to
prosecutors. Sentencing commissions have considered whether it is possible
and appropriate to counter this enhanced prosecutorial influence by utilizing
some version of real-offense sentencing. As will be seen in the next Parts, the
states and the federal system have diverged greatly on this key point.
A. State Guidelines Systems

State sentencing guidelines emphasize simplicity and do not attempt to
incorporate much real-offense sentencing into their structures. Every state
sentencing guidelines system, whether presumptive or advisory, determines the

5. Id. at 418.
6. I have previously criticized this as a rationale for sentencing guidelines relying
greatly on real-offense sentencing. See David Yellen, Just Deserts and Lenient Prosecutors,

91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1434 (1997).
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7
applicable guidelines range largely based on the offense of conviction.
Following some version of the model first adopted by Minnesota, 8 state
guidelines systems rank statutory offenses in terms of perceived severity.
Adjustments are not made based on facts about how the offense was committed
or the offender's background. The one significant common exception to this
"charge-offense" focus relates to the offender's criminal history. Most state
guidelines that employ grids have one axis of the grid that is a measure of the
defendant's record of prior criminal convictions. Defendants with longer
criminal records receive more severe guideline ranges.
This charge-offense approach does not mean that real-offense sentencing
factors beyond criminal history play no role under state guidelines systems.
Most guidelines result in a range of permissible sentences, within which the
judge has broad discretion. Here, as in the traditional system, a judge can rely
on virtually any factor she deems relevant. There may or may not be a
requirement that the judge explain the choice of a particular sentence. In
addition, most guidelines systems allow judges to depart from the guidelines in
unusual cases. These departures are based on real-offense elements determined
at sentencing. 9 On the whole, though, it is fair to say that state guidelines
systems are largely charge-based and make only modest use of real-offense
sentencing.

B. FederalSentencing Guidelines

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are dramatically different than all state
systems. The U.S. Sentencing Commission adopted a model that incorporates
far more real-offense elements than any other structured-sentencing system
ever has. The Commission termed this structure a "compromise," 10 but that
characterization is highly misleading. It is a compromise weighted heavily
toward real-offense sentencing. For example, each offense Guideline contains
numerous "specific-offense characteristics," such as the amount of loss1 1 or
drug quantity involved in an offense, 12 or the possession or use of a dangerous
weapon. 13 In addition, "adjustments" that are applicable to all offenses include
7. For a thorough discussion of state guidelines systems around the country, see
Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy
issues, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1190 (2005).
8. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978-2003, 32 CRIME &
JUST. 131, 138-39 (2005) (describing the Minnesota guidelines).
9. Id. at 153-56 (outlining Minnesota case law governing permissible and prohibited
departure grounds); see also Barr v. State, 674 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1996) (holding that departure
can be based on conduct that could not be separately charged as a crime).
10. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1988).
11. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Bl.1(b)(1) (2004).
12. Id. § 2D1.1(c).
13. See, e.g., id. § 2Dl.l(b)(1).
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the defendant's role in the offense, the criminal's selection of Iarticularly
vulnerable victims, and behavior constituting obstruction of justice.
Most dramatically, for major categories of offenses such as fraud and
narcotics, the Guidelines call for sentences to be based not just on offenses for
which the defendant has been convicted but also on "alleged related" offenses,
committed in the same course of conduct or as part of a common scheme or
plan. 15 In other words, if the judge concludes, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the defendant committed other related offenses, those other
offenses are included in the Guidelines calculation. This determination is true if
those related offenses were never charged, if the charges were dropped as part
16
of a plea agreement, or even if the defendant was acquitted of that conduct.
Although judges in discretionary systems can take other alleged offenses into
account,17 the federal approach is truly radical. The Federal Guidelines are a
mandatory system; a judge applying the Guidelines must base the sentence on
alleged related offenses. Further, the Guidelines consider alleged related
offenses just as much as charges that have resulted in conviction.
The federal approach to real-offense sentencing has been widely and
severely criticized as overly complex, rigid, and unfair.18 It is striking that no
other structured-sentencing system has adopted similar policies.
C. The Impact of Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker
The Supreme Court's line of cases beginning with Apprendi v. New
Jersey,19 and extending to Blakely v. Washington2° and United States v.
Booker, 2 1 has dramatically altered the sentencing landscape, particularly as it
relates to real-offense sentencing. Under these decisions, any fact that has the
effect of increasing the maximum punishment to which the defendant is
effectively exposed must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt unless
admitted by the defendant. Apprendi dealt with formal statutory maximums,

14. See id. ch. 3.
15. Id. § 1B1.3(a)(2).
16. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S.
389 (1995). Note that the viability of these decisions, as to the mandatory consideration of
such information, has been called into question by United States v. Booker. See infra note 21
and accompanying text.
17. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (upholding a death sentence
where the judge relied on an allegation that the defendant had committed multiple burglaries
for which he had not been convicted).
18. See, e.g., Reitz, supra note 2; Yellen, supra note 2. For one of the few scholarly
defenses of real-offense sentencing under the Federal Guidelines, see Julie R. O'Sullivan, In
Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified Real-Offense System, 91 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1342 (1997).
19. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
20. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
21. 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).
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while Blakely and Booker extended this rationale to many determinate

guidelines systems. In Blakely, the Court invalidated a sentence above the
normal range under Washington State's guidelines. In Booker, the Court
"cured" the Federal Guidelines' constitutional infirmity by declaring the
Guidelines to be advisory rather than binding.
The impact of these decisions on real-offense sentencing varies greatly.
There is no effect on traditional systems of judicial discretion; the Court
expressly noted that where broad judicial discretion is granted by law, judges

can continue to sentence based on any factors they deem relevant. Advisory
guidelines systems are also unaffected. Blakely and Booker only address

guidelines systems that have the force of law. The states with presumptive
guidelines systems are impacted only modestly. For now, at least, the one realoffense element commonly incorporated into state guidelines calculationscriminal history-need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Upward
departures from presumptive guidelines ranges must now be based on facts
presented to a jury or admitted by the defendant, but contested upward
departures are relatively rare in state guidelines systems. Some states are
already dealing with this by empanelling
juries when there are disputed facts
22
that might lead to an upward departure.
The federal system has been more dramatically changed, as the Federal
Guidelines are now advisory, at least formally. The real-offense components of
the Guidelines remain highly influential, though, since judges are required to
continue to calculate the Guidelines range as they had done so before and
"consider" the resulting range. If Congress opts to make the Guidelines binding
again by authorizing the use of juries to resolve factual disputes, the realoffense components of the Federal Guidelines could continue, although with a
different process and a higher burden of proof. It is also important to note that,
again at least for now, the Court has not disturbed the ability of judges to find
23
facts that establish a minimum sentence, either by guideline or by statute.
Unless the Court reverses course, 24 guidelines that are "topless ' 25 are

22. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4718(b)(2) (2005) (authorizing Kansas courts to present
disputed aggravating facts to juries).
23. United States v. Harris, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (upholding, over an Apprendi
challenge, the use of judicial fact-finding to impose mandatory minimum sentence); see also
Spero v. United States, 375 F.3d 1285, 1286 (11 th Cir. 2004) ("Whatever other effect the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Blakely v. Washington . . . may have, it does not
undermine the validity of minimum mandatory sentences, at least not where the enhanced
minimum does not exceed the non-enhanced maximum.").
24. Harris, like Apprendi, Booker, and Blakely, was a 5-4 decision. Justice Breyer, a
member of the Harris majority and a dissenter in Apprendi, acknowledged that the two
decisions were in tension but reiterated his hope that the Court would reverse Apprendi. See
Harris,536 U.S. at 569-72 (Breyer, J.,
concurring). Now that Apprendi has been solidified in
Booker and Blakely, the Court may revisit Harris.
25. For a discussion of "topless" guidelines, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, Memorandum
Presentinga Proposalfor Bringing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines into Conformity with
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constitutional, and real-offense sentencing fact-finding can continue as it had in
the past.
Clearly, the Supreme Court has not abolished real-offense sentencing. In
fact, it has barely disturbed it for many jurisdictions. Every jurisdiction, then,
will have to continue to grapple with the appropriate role for real-offense
sentencing. In the Conclusion of this Article, I will lay out a few principles that
should guide this consideration.
CONCLUSION: SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES

This Conclusion offers some thoughts on the proper use of real-offense
sentencing information, regardless of whether a sentencing system utilizes
judicial discretion, advisory guidelines, or presumptive guidelines.
A. Simplicity

The various state guidelines systems have all opted for simplicity. Only a
few of the many factors that might be relevant to sentencing are included in the
guidelines calculation. The rest is left to the sound exercise of judicial
discretion. In contrast, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are highly complex,
incorporating an elaborate version of real-offense sentencing. There is a broad
consensus among professional and academic observers that the complexity and
rigidity engendered by the federal "relevant conduct" approach, combined with
an overemphasis on quantifiable factors, have failed. 2 6 The more modest goals
of state sentencing guidelines result in a workable system that achieves
appropriate individualization of sentences
considerable consistency but 2allows
7
based on real-offense factors.
It is true that charge-offense guidelines result in a great deal of sentencing
authority being shifted to prosecutors. However, it is far from clear that the
federal approach does better in this regard. All that real-offense guidelines do is
protect against prosecutorial leniency or undercharging. z 8 If this is a problem
Blakely v. Washington, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 364, 367 (2004).
26. Recently, a bipartisan group sponsored by the Constitution Project and co-chaired
by former Attorney General Edwin Meese and former Deputy Attorney General Philip
Heymann (for which Professor Frank Bowman and I serve as co-reporters) released a set of
principles that criticizes the Federal Guidelines. See Constitution Project, Principles for the
Design and Reform of Sentencing Systems (2005), http://www.constitutionproject.org/si/
Principles.doc (last visited Sept. 13, 2005); see also AM. COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS,
UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2004: AN EXPERIMENT THAT HAS FAILED (2004),
http://www.actl.com/pdfs/SentencingGuidelines-3.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2005); Frank 0.
Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A StructuralAnalysis, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 1315 (2005).

27. See Steven Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377,
386-90 (2005).
28. For a discussion of prosecutorial complicity in Guidelines "evasion," see Nancy J.

HeinOnline -- 58 Stan. L. Rev. 274 2005-2006

October 2005]

REAL-OFFENSE SENTENCING

charging
that requires attention, it is better addressed through prosecutorial
29
guidelines than through real-offense sentencing guidelines.
B. Transparency

A great failing of how traditional sentencing systems deal with real-offense
sentencing is their opacity. If a guidelines system is going to leave judges
considerable authority to inject real-offense components into sentencing, either
through selection of a sentence within the authorized guidelines range or
through a departure sentence, it is important that this be done in a transparent
way. Regardless of the sentencing mechanism, judges should be required to
explain their sentences. This will further due process at sentencing, enable
appellate courts to develop appropriate common law sentencing principles, and
provide feedback to commissions that will be useful in refining guidelines.
C. CriminalConduct
One particular form of real-offense sentencing deserves special mention.
One of the most unseemly aspects of the Guidelines is the fact that defendants
are sentenced based on other alleged offenses for which they have not been
convicted. After Booker, of course, this practice will no longer continue in the
same way. However, the now-advisory Guidelines contain the same provision.
As most sentences continue to be imposed within the applicable Guidelines
ranges, this provision still has a significant effect on sentences.
A sounder, fairer policy would be that Guidelines ranges not be enhanced
for conduct that could be the basis for a separate criminal charge. It is one thing
to consider facts about an offense for which the defendant has been convicted.
It is quite another to allow the government to bypass the trial or plea bargaining
process but still obtain the sentencing "benefit" of the alleged criminal conduct.
Several states already prohibit consideration of such conduct, 30 and it would be
wise for the Federal Guidelines to be revised in this manner as well.

King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bargained Punishment, 58

STAN. L. REv. 293 (2005) (in this Issue).
29. See Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice, to
All Federal Prosecutors, Regarding "Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal
Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing" (Sept. 22, 2003) ("[Ilf readily provable
facts are relevant to calculations under the Sentencing Guidelines, the prosecutor must
disclose them to the court, including the Probation Office. Likewise, federal prosecutors may
not 'fact bargain,' or be party to any plea agreement that results in the sentencing court
having less than a full understanding of all readily provable facts relevant to sentencing.").
For an insightful discussion of prosecutorial guidelines, see Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial
Guidelinesand the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1087 (2005).
30. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. PRO. 3.701(d)(l1); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app. II.D. 103

(2005) ("[D]epartures from the guidelines should not be permitted for elements of alleged
offender behavior not within the definition of the offense of conviction.").
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